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Note
Punitive Damages in California: The Drunken Driver
Punitive or exemplary damages are extracompensatory penalties im-
posed against a defendant who commits a particularly egregious act.1
Courts have invoked this long-standing remedy,2 currently available in
all but five jurisdictions, 3 to penalize defendants for conduct such as as-
1. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 204 (1973); see
DiGorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 580, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350, 361 (1963);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). Punitive or exemplary damages should be
distinguished from statutory penalties, although both are extracompensatory awards levied in
pursuit of deterrence and punishment. Statutory penalties are appropriate in factual contexts
prescribed by statute, regardless of the actor's state of mind; punitive damages may be assessed
when the actor exhibits the statutorily required state of mind, regardless of the fact situation.
See 23 CAL. JUR. 3d Damages § 119, at 239 (1975); 4 B. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW Punitive or Exemplary Damages § 849, at 3143 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984). Compensa-
tory damages, on the other hand, are sums awarded to recompense the plaintiff for actual
damage proximately caused by the defendant. See 23 CAL. JUR. 3d Damages § 117, at 236
(1975 & Supp. 1984).
2. See K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES §§ 2.1-2.3(B), at 23-33 (1980); Ellis, Fairness
and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 12-20 (1982).
Punitive damages have been traced to Biblical times and even to the time of the Code of
Hammurabi in 2000 B.C. See, e.g., Igoe, Punitive Damages: An Analytical Perspective, TRIAL,
Nov. 1978, at 48, 50. The doctrine first appeared in Anglo-American law in Huckle v. Money,
2 Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763).
As early as 1851 the United States Supreme Court declared that the doctrine's propriety
"will not admit of argument." Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851). When
California common law was first codified in 1872, punitive damages were provided for in Civil
Code § 3294. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 807, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348,
380-81 (1981).
3. Puerto Rico, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington do not recognize
punitive damages. Ganapolsky v. Park Gardens Dev. Corp., 439 F.2d 844, 846 (1st Cir. 1971)
(applying Puerto Rican law); Boutte v. Hargrove, 277 So. 2d 757 (La. 1973), modified, 290 So.
2d 319 (La. 1974); City of Loweil v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 269-
70, 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (1943); Miller v. Kingsley,. 194 Neb. 123, 230 N.W.2d 472 (1975);
Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods., 73 Wash. 2d 23, 436 P.2d 186 (1968). Connecticut, Michi-
gan, and New Hampshire allow the award only under limited circumstances, as recovery for
otherwise incompensable loss. LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F. Supp. 301, 305-06 (D. Conn. 1973);
Armstrong v. Dolge, 130 Conn. 516, 520, 36 A.2d 24, 26 (1944) (litigation expenses); Wise v.
Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 233, 190 N.W. 746, 747 (1922) (injured feelings); Bixby v. Dunlap, 56
N.H. 456, 462-63 (1876) (mental distress and vexation); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873)
(injured feelings). Indiana prohibits punitive damages awards if the defendant is subject to
criminal prosecution for the same offense. See Aldridge, The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary
Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20 IND. L.J. 123, 123 (1945).
sault,4 defamation, 5 seduction, 6 malicious prosecution, 7 and conversion. 8
While the doctrine underlying compensatory damages focuses on the ex-
tent of harm that the defendant caused, the doctrine of punitive damages
focuses on the defendant's state of mind. 9
Section 3294 of the California Civil Code allows punitive damages
when the defendant has been found guilty of malice, oppression, or
fraud.10 Section 3294 defines malice as "conduct which is intended by
the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or conduct which is carried
on by the defendant with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others.""l Thus, the imposition of punitive damages does not require an
intent to do harm; under the "conscious disregard" standard, a defend-
ant who commits a nondeliberate tort' 2 is subject to punitive liability if
he knew the probable harmful consequences of his conduct.' 3
Considerable controversy surrounds the imposition of punitive dam-
ages for nondeliberate torts. 14 Despite general acceptance of the doctrine
of punitive damages,' 5 the imposition of such an award remains disfa-
vored. 16 Critics of the doctrine argue that exemplary awards create a
4. Maxa v. Neidlein, 163 Md. 366, 163 A. 202 (1932); Trogdon v. Terry, 172 N.C. 540,
90 S.E. 583 (1916); Bannister v. Mitchell, 127 Va. 578, 104 S.E. 800 (1920).
5. Reynolds v. Pegler, 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955); Coffin v.
Brown, 94 Md. 190, 50 A. 567 (1901); Loftsgaarden v. Reiling, 267 Minn. 181, 126 N.W.2d
154, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964); Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 106
S.E.2d 258 (1958).
6. Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290 (1917).
7. Brown v. McBride, 24 Misc. 235, 52 N.Y.S. 620 (1898); Jackson v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 139 N.C. 347, 51 S.E. 1015 (1905).
8. Lindgren Plumbing Co. v. Doral Country Club, Inc., 196 So. 2d 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Watkins v. Layton, 182 Kan. 702, 324 P.2d 130 (1958); Jones v. Fisher, 42 Wis.
2d 209, 166 N.W.2d 175 (1969).
9. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at
11 (5th ed. 1984); see Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward A Principled Approach, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 639, 651 (1980).
10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1985). This Note is concerned only with
malice as a basis for punitive liability.
11. Id. § 3294(c)(1).
12. The term "nondeliberate tort" is used here to mean tortious behavior which does not
involve intent to injure or knowledge that injury is substantially certain to ensue. The term is
used synonymously with "unintentional tort."
13. See Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 162-63, 642 P.2d 1305, 1314, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 784, 793 (1982); Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 895, 598 P.2d 854, 857, 157
Cal. Rptr. 693, 696 (1979); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 218 (1975).
14. See Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 901-11, 598 P.2d at 860-66, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 700-706
(Clark, J., dissenting); Franson, Exemplary Damages in Vehicle Accident Cases, 50 CAL. ST.
B.J. 93, 93 (1975); Mallor & Roberts, supra note 9, at 651.
15. See supra notes 2-3 & accompanying text.
16. See Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 901-02, 598 P.2d at 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (Clark, J.,
dissenting); Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 749-50, 168 Cal. Rptr.
237, 242 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 651 (1981); Henderson v. Security Nat'l. Bank, 72
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windfall for the plaintiff,17 constitute an excessively severe sanction
against the defendant,18 and are imposed without the procedural safe-
guards traditionally afforded a defendant subject to extracompensatory
punishment such as criminal sanctions.19 Under this view, the reprehen-
sibility of acts committed with an actual intent to harm may justify a
punitive award, but acts committed without such an intent provide no
equivalent justification for punitive liability.20
Others argue, however, that a voluntary disregard of an act's dan-
gerous consequences in certain contexts may be as reprehensible as an
intent to harm.21 Moreover, socially costly conduct should be mini-
mized;22 when compensatory and criminal liability provide insufficient
disincentire for socially undesirable behavior, punitive damages may pro-
vide the necessary deterrent.2 3 Essentially, the controversy over the pro-
priety of punitive liability for nondeliberate torts distills to one issue:
whether or not a particular harmful act is sufficiently egregious, deter-
rable, and socially costly to warrant the punitive sanction.
Driving while intoxicated is an act for which punitive liability may
be appropiate. Each year, intoxicated drivers in the United States kill
20,000 to 30,000 people,24 seriously injure 120,000,25 and cause over half
of all fatal automobile accidents.2 6 Driving while intoxicated engenders
an annual estimated cost of six billion dollars,27 and despite penal and
compensatory sanction, the problem continues.28
Cal. App. 3d 765, 771, 140 Cal. Rptr. 388, 392 (1977); Ferraro v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 8 Cal.
App. 3d 339, 351, 87 Cal. Rptr. 226, 233 (1970).
17. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 902, 598 P.2d at 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (Clark, J., dissent-
ing); Rosener, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 750, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 242; see D. DOBBS, supra note 1,
§ 3.9, at 219-20.
18. See Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 79, 90
(1982); Ellis, supra note 2, at 2 & n.7.
19. See Ellis, supra note 2, at 37-43; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 9, at 644; Note, The
Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1158, 1180-81 (1966).
20. See, eg., Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116 P. 530 (1911) (evil motive required for
punitive liability); Ellis, supra note 2, at 5-6, 22 (purposeful harm warrants punishment).
21. See Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 896-97, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697; W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, supra note 9, § 2, at 10.
22. Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions A Study of Deterrence, 67 MICH. L.
REv. 421, 421 (1969); Mallor & Roberts, supra note 9, at 647-50, 669.
23. See Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 897, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697; Mallor &
Roberts, supra note 9, at 647-50; see also infra notes 62-71 & accompanying text.
24. Ferrin, Drunk Driving in California-How Bad Is It?, MOTORLAND, Nov.-Dec. 1980,
at 32, 32.
25. Id.
26. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 898-99, 598 P.2d at 858-59, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
27. See Katz, Ohio's New Drunk Driving Law: A Halfhearted Experiment in Deterrence,
34 CASE W. RES. 239, 240 (1983-1984).
28. The recidivism rate for drunken drivers has been estimated at 50-75%. W. MID-
DENDORF, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNISHMENT 20 (1968).
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Many states, including California, authorize punitive damages for at
least some instances of drunken driving. 29 It remains unclear, however,
whether exemplary liability is appropriate for drunken driving per se, 30
that is, in every situation in which an intoxicated 31 driver causes an
accident.
This Note examines whether punitive damages are per se an appro-
priate penalty for intoxicated driving. First, the Note reviews the policy
justifications for punitive damages. It then examines California case law
to determine the elements of the conscious disregard standard, which is
the legal limitation on exemplary liability. The Note explores policy and
precedent in an analysis of various drunken driving scenarios. The Note
concludes that punitive damages should be available to all plaintiffs who
are victims of drunken driving accidents. 32
Public Policy Foundations of Punitive Damages
Punishment 33 and deterrence 34 are the traditional justifications for
29. See cases cited infra note 122.
30. "Drunk driving per se" refers to all situations in which a driver who is intoxicated as
defined by CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152, see infra note 31, causes an accident, regardless of the
blood alcohol level, presence of aggravating factors, such as the defendant's prior drunk driv-
ing arrests and accidents or the recklessness of the defendant's driving, and the extent, nature,
and cause of damage sustained by the plaintiff. It thus comprises a broader situation than
those adjudicated in Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 642 P.2d 1305, 181 Cal Rptr.
784 (1982); Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979);
and Dawes v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 168 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1980), in which puni-
tive damages were ruled appropriate for particular instances of drunk driving.
31. Terms such as "drunken driving" or "driving while intoxicated" are used in this Note
to refer to conduct prohibited by CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152 (West Supp. 1984). Section 23152
provides:
(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of an alcoholic beverage
or any drug, or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and any drug,
to drive a vehicle.
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.10 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol
in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.
For purposes of this subdivision, percent, by weight, of alcohol shall be based
upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliters of blood.
See also id. § 23155(a)(3) (presumption that person with 0.10% blood alcohol level at the time
of chemical analysis was under the influence of alcoholic beverage at time of the alleged
offense).
32. This Note is not an empirical or quantitative attempt to determine whether punitive
damages will deter drunk driving. Instead, the Note accepts the California Supreme Court's
conclusion that policy and precedent justify punitive damages for some instances of drunk
driving and analyzes whether that conclusion may reasonably be expanded, in light of policy
and precedent, to new situations.
33. See Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 800-01, 197 P.2d 713, 720
(1948); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 382
(1981); CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1985); see also Ellis, supra note 2, at 4-8;
Mallor & Roberts, supra note 9, at 648-50; Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1258, 1279-80 (1976).
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punitive damages.35 Under punishment theory, punitive liability is ap-
propriate when the defendant has committed a reprehensible act. 36 De-
terrence theory supports exemplary liability only if the sanction is likely
to discourage wrongful conduct.37
Punishment
According to punishment theory, punitive liability is a lawful ex-
pression of societal outrage at a defendant's reprehensible conduct.38
Punishment theory rests on a principle of fairness: each defendant should
receive his or her "just desserts."' 39 This principle presents substantive
and procedural limitations on the imposition of punitive damages.
Substantively, only a reprehensible act merits punishment.4° The act
must be "outrageous," 41 evince "moral culpability, ' 42 or at least be
"knowingly wasteful."'43 The defendant must have desired to harm44 or
to insult someone, 45 or at least have known that his act threatened others
with probable danger.46 Punishment theory thereby justifies punitive
damages for defamation, 47 assult,4 8 withholding information in the sale
34. See Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 155, 642 P.2d 1305, 1309, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 784, 788 (1982); Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 897, 598 P.2d 854, 857, 157
Cal. Rptr. 693, 697 (1979); Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 790, 598 P.2d 45,
55, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 402 (1979); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 810,
174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 382 (1981); Fletcher v. Western Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376,
409, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 99 (1970); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1985); Ellis, supra note
2, at 8-10; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 9, at 648-50.
35. Two other concepts occasionally offered as justification for punitive damages, "pre-
serving the peace" and "inducing private law enforcement," may be incorporated into a
broader definition of deterrence called "social efficiency." Two purported rationales for exem-
plary damages, compensating the victims for otherwise uncompensable damages and paying
plaintiffs' attorney fees, do not justify the punitive damage doctrine, but may explain why
damages imposed against a defendant are paid to the victim-plaintiff, rather than to the state.
See Ellis, supra note 2, at 3-12.
36. Id. at 5-6.
37. See infra notes 61-94 & accompanying text.
38. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, § 2, at 9-10; Ellis, supra note 2, at 5.
39. See Ellis, supra note 2, at 6.
40. The term "punishment" is used here only as it applies to punitive damages.
41. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, § 2, at 9; Ellis, supra note 2, at 5, 15; see
Coats v. Construction & Gen. Laborers Local 185, 15 Cal App. 3d 908, 916, 93 Cal. Rptr. 639,
643 (1971); DiGorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 580, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350,
361-62 (1963).
42. Note, Taylor v. Superior Court: Punitive Damages for Non-Deliberate Torts-The
Drunk Driving Context, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 911, 922 (1980); see C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES
§ 77, at 280 (1935).
43. Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 103, 110-11 (1982).
44. Ellis, supra note 2, at 6.
45. Id. at 15.
46. Id. at 6.
47. See supra note 5.
48. See supra note 4.
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of a drug,49 or refusing to rectify a known dangerous product,50 but not
for acts that only unexpectedly cause harm. 51 Thus, punishment theory
limits the imposition of punitive damages to wilful, reprehensible acts.
Procedural fairness mandates adequate safeguards against the unjust
imposition of liability.5 2 Criminal law, the traditional domain of punish-
ment, 53 employs such procedural safeguards as proof beyond a reason-
able doubt, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the protection
against double jeopardy.5 4 Civil law, in which punitive damage awards
are assessed, does not offer these safeguards, and a jury's discretion to
determine the propriety and amount of punitive damages exacerbates this
deficiency. 5 Although some commentators have demanded the abolition
of exemplary damages for this reason, 56 California courts have held that
because exemplary awards are civil in nature, the procedural safeguards
associated with criminal prosecutions do not apply.5 7
49. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
50. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
51. Ellis, supra note 2, at 5-6, 22. Punitive damages may not be imposed against a de-
fendant who did not actually know of the potential harmful consequences. See infra note 108
& accompanying text.
52. Procedural fairness is essentially the same as procedural due process mandated by the
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution applied to the states by the fourteenth
amendment. See Ellis, supra note 2, at 3-12, 21-23.
53. Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 902, 598 P.2d 854, 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693,
700 (1979) (Clark, J., dissenting).
54. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 9, at 645.
55. See Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 902, 598 P.2d at 861, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). If the punitive damage claim is not unwarranted as a matter of law, the jury
decides whether to impose punitive damages and, if so, the appropriate amount. See Ellis,
supra note 2, at 37-43; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 9, at 644-46.
56. See Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 901-06, 598 P.2d at 860-63, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 700-703
(Clark, J., dissenting); Ellis, supra note 2, at 37-43; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 9, at 644.
For arguments in favor of abolishing the doctrine, see DEFENSE RESERARCH INSTITUTE, THE
CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1960); Carsey, The Case
Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline, 11 FORUM 57 (1975); Long,
Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870 (1976).
Additionally, many authors have suggested specific ways to remedy these procedural
problems. See, e.g., Mallor & Roberts, supra note 9, at 663-69 (judge rather than jury should
assess amount of award, employing factors such as degree of reprehensibility, profitability of
conduct, wealth of defendant, and possibility of defendant's being subject to criminal and other
civil liability); Owen, supra note 43, at 119-20 (clear and convincing evidence test, minimum
and maximum award limits, decision-making power shifted to judge).
57. See Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 159-61, 642 P.2d 1305, 1311-13, 181
Cal. Rptr. 784, 790-92 (1982); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 811-12,
174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383 (1981); Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 18 Cal. App. 3d 266,
272, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (1971); Gibson v. Gibson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 943, 949, 93 Cal. Rptr.
617, 620-21 (1971); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 717, 60 Cal. Rptr.
398, 417-18 (1967); see also Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 150-51 (1956);
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402-04 (1938). Specifically, in Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App.
3d at 811-12, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 383, the court rejected the arguments that punitive damages
amount to double jeopardy, that § 3294 fails to give sufficient guidance to the judge and jury,
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Procedural fairness in civil law, however, does require adequate no-
tice that an act is wrong.58 If punitive liability arises only for reprehensi-
ble acts, the actor is more likely to have known that his act deserved
punishment, and the notice requirement is more likely met. 59
Thus, substantive and procedural fairness concerns indicate that pu-
nitive damages should be imposed only for reprehensible or outrageous
conduct. While the definition of reprehensible conduct is inherently sub-
jective, the essence of a reprehensible act is its known likelihood to cause
harm.60
Deterrence
A deterrent sanction discourages the defendant from repeating his
wrongful conduct and discourages others from committing that same
wrong a first time. 61 Under deterrence theory, punitive liability is appro-
priate when such damages are necessary for deterrence, likely to deter,
and economically efficient.
Necessity
According to deterrence theory,62 an actor will refrain from certain
behavior if the losses resulting from the act outweigh the gains. 63 Con-
versely, if an actor expects to profit from his wrongful conduct despite
and that a clear and convincing evidence test should be employed. The court also rejected the
argument that the punitive damage award violated defendant's due process right of fair warn-
ing, because the defendant knew that punitive damages could be awarded for nondeliberate
torts. Id. at 811, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 383 (citing Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 863,
869-70, 118 P.2d 465, 468-69 (1941)); see also Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 684 F.2d 658,
663 n.5 (9th Cir. 1982) (uncertainty as to amount of potential punitive award not
unconstitutional).
58. Ellis, supra note 2, at 5-6.
59. Id. at 22.
60. See supra notes 38-59.
61. Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 156, 642 P.2d 1305, 1309-10, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 784, 788-89 (1982); Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 790, 598 P.2d 45, 55,
157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 402 (1979); Ellis, supra note 2, at 8. A third purpose of deterrence is to
preserve the peace by providing financial remuneration through the courts and thereby dis-
couraging victims or third parties from pursuing private revenge. Ellis, supra note 2, at 9-10.
This theory is not dealt with here because it has no prominence in California case law.
62. A sanction may deter by educating the wrongdoer or the public and by instilling a
fear of the consequences of wrongful conduct. These two influences may in turn engender
"unconscious inhibitions that make lawful and desired behavior habitual behavior." Cramton,
supra note 22, at 426 (emphasis in original).
63. This may be quantified, or at least conceptualized, by analogy to the formula of B =
P X L introduced by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). Here, "B" represents the benefit the actor derives from the act, "P" is
the probability liability will ensue, and "L" is the severity of the liability imposed. When the
benefit of the act is less than the liability the actor will suffer multiplied by the perceived
probability that liability will be imposed, the actor will not engage in the act. For example, if
the benefit "B" of an act is $10, the fine imposed is $30, and there is a .5 (50%) probability of
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compensatory and criminal liability, he will commit the wrong unless he
faces some further sanction. Punitive damages supply this additional
threat of liability. Thus, punitive damages are necessary when compen-
satory and criminal liability does not provide sufficient disincentive to
wrongful conduct.
Compensatory damages alone rarely will provide adequate disincen-
tive. First, compensatory damages will not deter a wrongdoer who be-
lieves that his act will benefit him more than it will harm others. 6r In
such cases, a threat of greater liability is necessary to outweigh the per-
ceived benefit and deter the act.
Second, compensatory liability will not deter an actor who antici-
pates that he may escape all liability because the wrongful conduct will
not be detected.65 Again, increasing the potential liability is necessary to
deter; the actor may risk a small chance of $500 liability, but not the
same chance of $1000 liability.66
When compensatory damages are insufficient disincentives, the pos-
sibility of criminal liability may obviate the need for punitive damages by
increasing the actor's potential liability.6 7 Yet criminal sanctions have
not proved to be adequate deterrents in all cases. 68 The greater standard
of proof in criminal cases makes penal sanction relatively unlikely, and
apprehension and imposition of liability, the actor will refrain from acting because $10 < .5 X
$30, or $15. Thus, the actor is deterred by the $30 fine.
64. Ellis, supra note 2, at 25. Examples include an actor who seeks to avenge his lover's
infidelity, see, e.g., Holdaway v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 78, 505 P.2d 295, 295 (1973), a broker
who engages in wrongful activities that render profits exceeding his liability to consumers, see,
e.g., Ward v. Taggert, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959), and a past employee who wrong-
fully solicits customers of his former employer, see, e.g., Southern California Disinfecting Co.
v. Lomkin, 183 Cal. App. 2d 431, 7 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1960).
65. See Ellis, supra note 2, at 25. This may indicate that compensatory damages are
insufficient deterrents in all cases. There are few acts for which there is a 100% chance of
detection, apprehension, and imposition of liability. See Owen, supra note 43, at 113.
66. See Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv.
949, 965 (1966); Ellis, supra note 2, at 25. According to the model presented supra note 63,
deterrence should result if the severity of the liability imposed is increased so that when it is
multiplied by the probability of liability the total exceeds the benefit the actor derives *from the
conduct. For example, if B = $10, P = 30%, and L = $30, deterrence should not result
because $10 > .3 X $30, or $9. If, however, L is increased to $100, then deterrence should
result because $10 < .3 X $100, or $30.
67. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 903, 598 P.2d at 861, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (Clark, J., dissent-
ing); Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Com-
ment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 144 (1982).
68. In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 820, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 389
(1981), the court stated: "It is precisely because monetary penalties under government regula-
tions prescribing business standards or the criminal law are so inadequate and ineffective as
deterrents against a manufacturer and distributor of mass-produced defective products that
punitive damages must be of sufficient amount to discourage such practices." See Mallor &
Roberts, supra note 9, at 657; Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REy.
1173, 1196 (1931).
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the high incidence of plea-bargains, suspended sentences, and immunity
minimizes the actual liability imposed.6 9 Criminal sanctions thus may
only marginally increase an actor's total liability. Furthermore, stiffer
criminal sanctions motivate defendants to fight the charge. The conse-
quent dilatory tactics and increased frequency of trials entail expendi-
tures of administrative time, funds, and other court resources. 70
In sum, punitive damages increase an actor's potential liability and
are necessary for deterrence when the severity or probability of compen-
satory and criminal liability is small, or when the actor's perceived bene-
fit from committing the act is great.7 '
Likelihood of Deterrence
Deterrence theory justifies an exemplary award only if the sanction
is reasonably likely to prevent wrongful conduct. Although prediction of
deterrent effect is extremely difficult, 72 it is generally accepted that the
great severity of a sanction and the perceived certainty of its imposition
enhance a sanction's deterrent effect.73
Punitive damages can be severe penalties74 because they are assessed
in part according to the defendant's wealth.75 This feature appears to
69. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 9, at 657. Additionally, it is established in California
that possible criminal penalties do not necessarily preclude the assessment of punitive dam-
ages. See, eg., Bundy v. Maginess, 76 Cal. 532, 18 P. 668 (1888); Wilson v. Middleton, 2 Cal.
54 (1852) (damages may be awarded even when punishment might also be imposed in the
ordinary course of law).
70. Katz, supra note 27, at 285.
71. The "preserving the peace" concept, see supra note 61, and the "undercompensation"
rationale, see supra note 35, give rise to a third situation in which punitive damages may be
warranted from a deterrence perspective. When the compensatory damages awarded the
plaintiff are less than his actual loss, additional liability may be appropriate. In this way,
punitive damages would theoretically be justified as assuring full compensation and deterring
third party vigilantism, plaintiff self-help, or other private vengeance. Ellis, supra note 2, at
26-29. On the other hand, there may already be sufficient deterrents against self-help. Id. at
29. Moreover, this idea probably justifies extracompensatory damages in nearly every case.
Owen, supra note 43, at 113.
72. See, eg., J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 13-24 (2d ed. 1978); U.S. DEP'T OF TRANS-
PORTATION, CAUSATION, CULPABILITY, AND DETERRENCE IN HIGHWAY CRASHES 127-29
(1970) [hereinafter cited as CAUSATION]; Katz, supra note 70, at 278-79. See generally
Andenaes, supra note 66. For example, while punishment is credited with decreasing personal
injury accidents by 50% in one experiment, the results were later criticized on methodological
grounds due to the character of the subjects and type of punishment imposed. See CAUSA-
TION, supra, at 128 (statistical problems of spontaneous remission and regression to the mean).
73. See Cramton, supra note 22, at 425, 427. Another factor in the efficacy of deterrence
is the speed with which the penalty is imposed: the shorter the time between the act and the
punishment, the greater the deterrent effect. Id; see Andenaes, supra note 66, at 961 n.21. The
speed factor is not considered here because the legal sanctions of compensatory, criminal, and
punitive liability are imposed at roughly the same time.
74. Ellis, supra note 2, at 2 & n.7.
75. See Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 928, 582 P.2d 980, 990, 148 Cal.
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contribute to the effectiveness of punitive liability as a viable deterrent. 76
In one study, researchers who asked traffic offenders what effect various
penalties would have on their subsequent driving habits were told that
substantial fines proportional to the offender's financial resources would
deter drivers from repeating their offenses. 77
The greater the actor's belief that punitive damages will be assessed,
the more likely the penalty will deter him.78 The perception that a sanc-
tion will be imposed may depend largely on the amount and type of pub-
licity a sanction receives. 79 For example, in 1962 Britain increased its
penalties for driving offenses but achieved little deterrent effect.80 In
1967, however, Britain publicized new laws that made conviction and
sanction more likely.81 Initially there was a substantial deterrent effect,
but the effect dissipated when the public perceived that the actual level of
enforcement was less than expected.8 2 Thus, although the certainty of
conviction seemed to influence behavior more than the severity of the
penalty, the increased certainty did not produce greater deterrent effect
unless the public perceived conviction to be likely. s 3
The interplay of the severity and certainty factors suggests that the
more reprehensible the act, the greater the likelihood of deterrence.
First, punitive liability is measured, in part, by the degree of reprehensi-
bility of the defendant's act.8 4  The greater the reprehensibility, the
greater the assessment and the higher the proportion to the defendant's
wealth.8 5  Second, the more reprehensible the act, the more likely the
actor will perceive the imposition of punitive damages to be certain.
Rptr. 389, 399 (1978); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 819-20, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348, 388-89 (1981) (wealth of defendant, reprehensibility of act, and amount of compen-
satory damages are appropriate considerations in computing or reviewing exemplary damage
assessment).
76. See, e.g., Homel, Penalties and the Drunk-Driver: A Study of One Thousand Offend-
ers, 14 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 225, 237 (1981) (heavy fines have an apparent deter-
rent effect on people convicted of drunk driving, especially young, low income offenders).
77. Id.
78. Cramton, supra note 22, at 425, 427. Certainty is considered a more influential factor
than severity. Id. at 427. On the other hand, this factor is readily manipulated. See infra
notes 79-83 & accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 70, at 281-84.
80. H. Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER 25-32 (1981).
8 1. Id. The British Road Safety Act of 1967 focused on increasing enforcement by grant-
ing police greater power to require drivers to submit to chemical testing and by making driving
with a 0.08% blood alcohol level a per se offense. Id. at 25-27.
82. The increased enforcement measures and concurrent publicity substantially reduced
the proportion of intoxicated drivers of all those drivers involved in fatal crashes. Id. at 25-32.
As the public realized that enforcement was not as stringent as originally publicized, however,
the deterrent effect decreased. Id. at 32-34.
83. Katz, supra note 70, at 281.
84. See supra note 75.
85. Fines that are substantial in light of the defendant's financial resources may have
deterrent effect. See supra notes 74-77 & accompanying text.
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Thus, deterrence theory suggests that limiting punitive liability to acts
that are reprehensible maximizes the likelihood that the sanction will de-
ter the targeted wrongdoing.
The characteristics of the individuals sought to be deterred may nev-
ertheless negate a potential deterrent effect. 86 For example, a person
highly motivated to engage in the prohibited behavior is harder to deter
than one only marginally motivated.87 A person whose wrongdoing is
rewarded by his peers or other influences may be similarly difficult to
deter.88 An irrational person, or one without adequate capacity or op-
portunity to consider the risks of punitive damages before acting, may be
impervious to punitive threats.8 9 If the act or the actors customarily en-
gaged in the act are not susceptible to the threat of punitive liability,
neither the increased severity nor the perceived certainty of punitive
damages will have significant deterrent effect.90
In sum, while prediction of deterrent effect is difficult, certain fac-
tors affect the likelihood that the punitive sanction will deter wrongdo-
ing. Whether punitive damages are likely to deter particular conduct
turns on the severity and perceived certainty of the sanction and the
characteristics of the actors typically performing the act.
Efficiency
Even if punitive damages are necessary and the act is amenable to
deterrence, punitive damages may not be an efficient deterrent. 9' Effi-
ciency may be measured in terms of net social benefit. 92 If a sanction
deters, it diminishes the frequency with which the wrong is committed
and ultimately reduces the loss society incurs from that wrong. If the
benefits of that reduction are greater than the cost of imposing the sanc-
tion, there is a net social benefit, and the sanction is an efficient
86. Cramton, supra note 22, at 427. These characteristics include the actor's motivation,
personality, and the "conflicting norms of groups to which the individual owes loyalty and
affection." Id. (citation omitted). These factors affect the benefit (B) perceived by the actor.
Theoretically, an increase in B may be offset, preserving the deterrent influence, by an
equivalent increase in P X L.
87. Id. Note that while punitive damages may be warranted as a deterrent when compen-
satory liability does not outweigh the actor's subjective benefit from the act, this same subjec-
tive benefit may provide motivations undermining the deterrent effect. In other words, there
may be some acts which simply cannot be deterred.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. In our model, B, the actor's perceived benefit, increases as his motivation or influ-
ences to engage in the conduct increase. At some point, the actor becomes undeterrable; be-
cause the probability of apprehension and liability cannot exceed 100%, any time the actor's
benefit exceeds the potential liability the actor will not be deterred.
91. See Ellis, supra note 2, at 8-9.
92. Id.
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deterrent.93
Societal losses due to wrongful conduct include the aggregate costs
incurred by all the victims and the administrative costs in apprehending,
adjudicating, and enforcing judgments against the wrongdoers. The
costs of imposing punitive damages include the extra court time needed
to adjudicate and enforce the punitive damage claim and the aggregate
costs to plaintiffs of pursuing, and to defendants of defending against the
claim. As long as the aggregate losses are greater than the cost of impos-
ing punitive liability, the sanction is efficient.
A sanction may be socially inefficient, however, if it causes society to
lose the benefit of some rightful conduct. For example, if an actor over-
estimates the likelihood or amount of potential punitive liability for mar-
keting a defective product, he may over-invest in precautions against that
defect at the expense of research, development, or safety precautions re-
garding other potential defects.94
Summary of Public Policy Background
According to punishment theory, the essential considerations in jus-
tifying punitive liability are procedural and substantive fairness. Limit-
ing punitive liability to sufficiently reprehensible acts satisfies these
concerns. From the perspective of deterrence theory, there are three ma-
jor issues: whether compensatory and criminal liability provide insuffi-
cient disincentive; whether punitive damages deter; and whether
deterrence is efficient.
The Legal Standard of Culpability for Punitive Damages:
Conscious Disregard of Others
Although public policy concerns may justify punitive liability
for certain acts, punitive damages actually may be imposed only when
the plaintiff can demonstrate that certain legal requirements are met.95
Thus, statutes and case law pose a second basis for determining the pro-
priety of an exemplary award.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 57. Additionally, while the potential punitive damage award may encourage
plaintiffs to pursue meritorious actions that they otherwise might not have brought, see Mallor
& Roberts, supra note 9, at 649-50, the attractiveness of such recovery increases the number of
cases filed, creates greater court congestion, increases social litigiousness, delays recovery for
those deserving recovery, delays punishment for those deserving punishment, postpones any
possible deterrent effect, and increases administrative costs. Moreover, as the stakes of litiga-
tion increase, litigation costs per case increase. See Denzau, Litigation Expenditures as Private
Determinants of Judicial Decisions: A Comment, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 297 (1979); Ellis,
supra note 2, at 56-57. "[Flor every $67 that reaches the injured person in product liability
cases, another $75 is spent in litigation costs." Schwartz, The Tort Dinosaur, LITIGATION, Fall
1983, at 16.
95. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1985).
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Punitive damages are appropriate when the defendant's act exhibits
malice.96 While intentional torts, such as assult, frequently demonstrate
this malice,97 nondeliberate torts may also evince malice. The necessary
mental state may be "recklessness," "wanton and wilful disregard," or
even "gross negligence. 98 In California, section 3294 of the Civil Code
defines malice, in part, as "conduct which is carried on by the defendant
with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." 99
It is not entirely clear what "conscious disregard" means. On the
one hand, it describes a state of mind short of an actual intent to in-
jure.100 On the other hand, California courts have refused to impose pu-
nitive damages for merely reckless acts because the "central spirit" of
section 3294 demands that the defendant's act evince an "evil motive." 101
Thus, "conscious disregard" necessarily implies a state of mind some-
where between intent to harm and recklessness.
An intent to harm exists when a person actually desires to cause
harm or when he knows to a substantial certainty that harm will result
96. Id; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, § 2, at 9-10.
97. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, § 2, at 10-11; see supra notes 4-8 & accom-
panying text.
98. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 9, at 651-52.
99. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1985). Prior to 1980, § 3294 did not define
malice, merely stating that either "express or implied" malice would suffice for punitive dam-
age liability. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1971). As a result, the malice standard was not
clear. See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 29, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218,
222-23 (1975); Taylor, Punitive Damages in Business Litigation, 3 ORANrG CouNTY BJ. 384,
386-87 (1976).
Some cases required the plaintiff to show the defendant's "evil motive" or "wrongful per-
sonal intention to injure." Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 162, 116 P. 530, 539 (1911); see
Note, Punitive Damages and the Intoxicated Driver: An Approach to Taylor v. Superior Court,
31 HASTiNGS L.J. 307, 313 n.43 (1979). Other cases recognized a conscious disregard of the
rights of others, or of the safety of others, to be sufficient. See id. at 313 n.44, 314 n.45. Still
other cases allowed punitive damages on a showing of the defendant's reckless disregard of the
safety or rights of others. See id. at 314 n.47. But see Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d
890, 895-96, 598 P.2d 854, 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 696 (1979); Liodas v. Sahdi, 19 Cal. 3d
278, 284-85, 562 P.2d 316, 319, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638 (1977); G.D. Searle v. Superior Court,
49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 224-25 (1975); Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal. App. 3d
891, 896, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706, 709 (1972). The trend in nondeliberate tort cases at the time,
however, was to recognize the "conscious disregard" standard. See Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 895-
96, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696; Dawes v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 88,
168 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322-23 (1980). This trend was codified in the 1980 revision of § 3294, and
reflected in revisions of California's approved jury instructions. See CALIFoRNIA JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS (BAJI) No. 14.72 (rev. 6th ed. 1981).
100. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985) (conscious disregard standard is
alternative standard to actual intent).
101. See Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 895, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696; Liodas, 19 Cal.
3d at 284-85, 562 P.2d at 319, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 638; G.D. Searle, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 32, 122
Cal. Rptr. at 224-25. Butsee Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 758, 161 Cal. Rptr.
322, 332-33 (1980).
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from his acts. 102 Thus, if a defendant tossed a bomb into an automobile
intending to kill the driver and knowing a passenger was also inside, the
defendant would be liable as if he intended to kill them both. 10 3 Reck-
lessness, on the other hand, occurs when a person acts or fails to act
despite the dangerous consequences he knows or should know could oc-
cur. 104 Thus, if the defendant had thrown the bomb intending to kill the
driver, believing that there was no one within a mile of the driver, he
would have only recklessly killed the passenger; the defendant had no
actual knowledge of the probability of the passenger's death. 105 The dis-
tinction between intent and recklessness thus lies in the actor's subjective
knowledge and the relative likelihood of harmful consequences. Actual
knowledge of a substantially certain harm evinces evil motive.10 6 An evil
motive is not present, however, when the defendant merely should have
known of a possible harm. 107
The conscious disregard formula consists of three elements that,
taken together, evidence the "evil motive" behind an act that was not
intended to cause injury. First, the defendant must be conscious of the
potential consequences of his act. Second, he must disregard those con-
sequences. Third, the consequences must endanger the rights or safety of
others.
The "consciousness" element requires that the defendant actually
know the potential harmful consequences of his act. '0 8 For example, pu-
nitive damages may be appropriate under the conscious disregard stan-
dard if a defendant knows that its railroad crossing poses danger to
102. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, § 8, at 35, § 34, at 212.
103. See id. § 8, at 31-32.
104. Id. § 34, at 212-14. Recklessness differs from negligence in the degree of danger the
act poses, or in the probability or foreseeablility of the threatened harm. See id.
105. See id. § 8, at 32.
106. See Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 895, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696; G.D. Searle, 49
Cal. App. 3d at 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
107. See Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 895, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696; G.D. Searle, 49
Cal. App. 3d at 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
108. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, § 34, at 213; see, e.g., Silberg v. California
Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974) (punitive damages not
warranted when plaintiff failed to show that defendant insurance company knew that its inter-
pretation of a policy was incorrect). Although the punitive damage claim in Silberg was based
on oppression grounds, the ruling exemplifies the actual awareness requirement. Accord Has-
son v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal. 3d 388, 402, 650 P.2d 1171, 1179-80, 185 Cal. Rptr. 654, 662-
63 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983); Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 895-96, 598 P.2d at 856,
157 Cal. Rptr. at 696; Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 809, 174 Cal. Rptr.
348, 381 (1981); O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 806, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 487, 491-92 (1977). But see Note, supra note 42, at 924 & n.84 (objective test will be
applied to determine punitive liability under conscious disregard standard in the drunken driv-
ing context).
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bypassers,10 9 or if a defendant knows that its product endangers consum-
ers.110 Exemplary liability would be inappropriate, however, when the
defendant is unaware of its product's danger, even if a reasonable manu-
facturer would have realized the potential harm.111 The subjective
knowledge requirement is the equivalent of the "evil" associated with
intent 1 2 and distinguishes the conscious disregard standard from
recklessness.
The "disregard" element denotes a choice to act in spite of the
dangers actually known. A volitional act or a volitional refusal to act
evidences this choice.1 13 Thus, the defendant exhibits a "conscious disre-
gard" state of mind when he volitionally acts, or fails to act, notwith-
standing the known harmful consequences. 114
The consequences of the defendant's conduct must pose a threat to
the safety or rights of others. Moreover, this threat usually must entail
probable harm to others. 115 For example, in Nolin v. National Conven-
ience Stores, 116 the defendant knew of a leaky gas nozzle and prior slip
and fall accidents at its self-service gas pump area; thus, the defendant
was "conscious." The defendant failed to provide a means of opening
cans or dispensing oil and failed to establish clean up procedures or to
post warning signs; thus, the defendant displayed "disregard." The court
held that the defendant's knowing nonfeasance constituted a conscious
disregard of the safety of others because the "[d]efendant's established
inattention to the danger showed a complete lack of concern regarding
the harmful potential-the probability and likelihood of injury. "117 In
109. See Seimon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 600, 136 Cal. Rptr. 787
(1977).
110. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
111. See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 31, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218,
224 (1975).
112. See supra note 106 & accompanying text.
113. This further distinguishes conscious disregard from recklessness; unless the actor ac-
tually knows of the consequences, he has not chosen to disregard them.
114. See, eg., Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal. 3d 388, 650 P.2d 1171, 185 Cal. Rptr.
654 (1982) (defendant knew of potential brake failure, yet failed to warn public or take avail-
able remedial steps), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983); Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d
890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979) (defendant knew of probable dangerous conse-
quences of driving while intoxicated, and knew that he had to drive after drinking); Grimshaw
v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (defendant knew of
danger of car's fuel tank and rear structure, yet failed to take remedial steps); O'Hara v. West-
ern Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977) (defendant's agents
knew of nearby rape attacks and description of a suspect, yet failed to warn tenant or provide
adequate security measures).
115. The requirement of probable harmful consequences distinguishes the conscious disre-
gard standard from recklessness (possible harm) and intent (substantially certain harm). See
supra notes 102-07 & accompanying text.
116. 95 Cal. App. 3d 279, 157 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1979).
117. Id. at 288, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 37 (emphasis added); see also Seimon v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 600, 609, 136 Cal. Rptr. 787, 792 (1977) (trial court improperly
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sum, the conscious disregard standard is satisfied when the defendant
voluntarily acts or fails to act knowing the probable harmful conse-
quences of his conduct. The subjective knowledge and probable harmful
consequences requirements determine whether the defendant acted with
a sufficiently evil motive. Because an actual intent to injure is not re-
quired, the conscious disregard standard authorizes punitive liability for
nonfeasance, as well as for malfeasance. 118
Application of Punitive Damages Principles to Drunken Drivers
Previous sections of this Note have examined two public policy ra-
tionales for punitive damages and the conscious disregard standard. Ac-
cording to punishment theory, punitive damages should be imposed
when the defendant's act is reprehensible;' 19 according to deterrence the-
ory, exemplary liability is appropriate when the sanction is necessary,
likely to deter wrongful conduct, and efficient.' 20 Under the conscious
disregard standard, punitive liability is imposed when the defendant acts
despite the known probable harmful consequences to others.' 2' This sec-
tion considers whether public policy and the conscious disregard stan-
dard support the imposition of punitive damages in the context of drunk
driving per se.122
The California Supreme Court first declared that drunk driving war-
ranted punitive damages in Taylor v. Superior Court.123 The plaintiff in
Taylor alleged that the defendant drove while intoxicated, struck the
dismissed plaintiff's punitive damage claim in case in which defendant railroad failed to rem-
edy known dangerous railroad crossing, because "the jury could have gleaned from [the] evi-
dence that defendant had displayed a conscious and callous indifference to, or disregard of,
probable harm to motorists" (emphasis added)).
118. See, e.g., Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, 95 Cal. App. 3d 279, 284-88, 157
Cal. Rptr. 32, 35-37 (1979); Seimon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 600, 607,
136 Cal. Rptr. 789, 791 (1977).
119. See supra notes 38-60 & accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 61-94 & accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 108-18 & accompanying text.
122. See supra note 30. Courts in two other states have held that when the defendant was
driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, the intoxication itself is an adequate
basis for punitive damages. Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc. 2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973); Harrell
v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973).
Many other states allow punitive damages against an intoxicated driver in certain circum-
stances. See, e.g., Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274 P. 639 (1929); Holmes v. Hollingsworth, 234
Ark. 347, 352 S.W.2d 96 (1961); Infeld v. Sullivan, 151 Conn. 506, 199 A.2d 693 (1964);
Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976); Madison v. Wigal, 18 Ill. App. 2d 564, 153
N.E.2d 90 (1958); Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954); Southland Broad-
casting Co. v. Tracy, 210 Miss. 836, 50 So. 2d 572 (1951); Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739,
487 P.2d 167 (1971); Payne v. Daley, 51 Ohio Misc. 65, 367 N.E.2d 75 (1977); Focht v.
Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970); Pratt v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, 191
S.W.2d 562 (1945).
123. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
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plaintiff's car head-on, and severely injured him. 124 He further alleged
that the defendant knew the dangers of drunk driving, because he had a
history of drunk driving arrests and previously had caused an automobile
accident while driving under the influence of alcohol.125
The court held that the plaintiff's allegations stated a valid claim for
punitive damages. The court defined a "conscious disregard" of the
safety of others as an act perpetrated despite its known dangerous conse-
quences. 126 It stated that "one who voluntarily commences, and thereaf-
ter continues, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of
intoxication, knowing from the outset that he must thereafter operate a
motor vehicle," exhibits a conscious disregard of the safety of others. 127
Because a "conscious disregard" constitutes malice, 128 the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff's exemplary damages claim was valid. 129
The drunken driving at issue in Taylor manifested all three elements
of the conscious disregard standard outlined in the previous section.1 30
First, the consciousness element was satisfied by the defendant's knowl-
edge, from the outset, that he would drive while intoxicated.1 31 Second,
the defendant, by choosing to drink despite his knowledge that he would
later have to drive, exhibited a wilful and deliberate1 32 decision to disre-
gard the dangerous consequences of drunk driving. Finally, driving
under the influence of alcohol creates a probable danger of harm to
others. 133
Two aspects of the Taylor decision warrant emphasis. First, the
court focused on the defendant's acts and state of mind when he began to
drink, before he became intoxicated. In other words, the court's analysis
focused on the driver's decision to drink, not the drinker's decision to
drive.
Second, the court reformulated the traditional conscious disregard
standard. Although the standard usually requires that the defendant's
124. Id. at 893, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 895-96, 598 P.2d at 857-58, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97.
127. Id. at 899, 598 P.2d at 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699. In Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App.
2d 517, 322 P.2d 933 (1958), the defendant allegedly knowingly became intoxicated and then
operated a motor vehicle. The court found that though his action was perhaps grossly negli-
gent, it was not malicious, and denied a punitive damage claim. Id. at 527, 322 P.2d at 939-40.
Taylor disapproved Gombos to the extent it was inconsistent, explaining that at the time Gom-
bos was decided it was unclear whether a conscious disregard of the safety of others constituted
malice. 24 Cal. 3d at 896, 899-90, 598 P.2d at 858, 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697, 699.
128. See supra note 99 & accompanying text.
129. 24 Cal. 3d at 899-90, 598 P.2d at 859-60, 157 Cal Rptr. at 698-99.
130. See supra notes 108-18 & accompanying text.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
132. 24 Cal. 3d at 895-96, 598 P.2d at 857-58, 157 Cal Rptr. at 696-97.
133. Id.
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act pose "probable harmful consequences," 1 34 the Taylor court required
only that the defendant's act threaten "probable dangerous con-
sequences."1 35
This reformulation was crucial to the court's holding. By changing
the standard from "probable harmful consequences" to "probable dan-
gerous consequences," the court was able to focus on the probability that
the harm that does occur will be severe, rather than the probability that
harm would occur. Drunken driving does not pose a threat of probable
harm because the likelihood of an accident while driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol, even though much greater than while sober, is so small
in any one trip that harmful consequences can hardly be deemed prob-
able. 136 While a drunken driving accident may not be likely, however,
the harm it causes is likely to be serious. 137 The combination of the
probability and severity of the harm creates the unacceptable danger
posed by drunk driving and establishes a rationale for punitive
liability. 138
In essence, the Taylor court required a risk of serious harm, rather
than a serious risk of harm. This revision of the conscious disregard
standard allowed the court to authorize exemplary liability for conduct
that might not have warranted punitive damages under a strict reading of
California precedent. 139
The Taylor decision advances the policies underlying punitive liabil-
ity. First, the court's decision is consonant with punishment theory,
which requires the defendant's act to be reprehensible.14° A decision to
drink to the point of intoxication before driving, in view of the known
threat that drunken driving poses to others, is as egregious as battery or
other acts for which punitive damages have traditionally been imposed.
In contrast, a person who, while intoxicated, decides to drive often lacks
the wilfulness required to justify the imposition of criminal
134. See supra notes 115-18 & accompanying text.
135. 24 Cal. 3d at 895-96, 598 P.2d at 857-58, 157 Cal Rptr. at 696-97 (emphasis added).
The Taylor court did not state that it was implementing a new test and did not explicitly
suggest that "probable dangerous consequences" modified the conscious disregard standard.
This Note argues, however, that the change in terminology is fundamental to the court's hold-
ing and shifts the emphasis of the standard.
136. Note, supra note 42, at 928-29.
137. Id.
138. See Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 899-900, 598 P.2d at 857-60, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696-99.
139. In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 816-17, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348,
386-87 (1981), the court reiterated the need for probability, rather than possibility, of harm,
noting that to express the "essential ingredient" of the conscious disregard standard most ac-
curately, "the rule should be expressed in terms of probability of injury rather than possibil-
ity." Nonetheless, the court cited, quoted, and applied the Taylor formulation of the standard,
stating that "plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous
consequences of his conduct." Id. at 809, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 381 (quoting Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at
895-96, 598 P.2d at 857-58, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97 (emphasis added)).
140. See supra notes 40-51 & accompanying text.
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punishment.141
Second, deterrence theory supports the Taylor holding. Punitive
damages may be necessary' 42 to deter drunk driving. The acts of drink-
ing before driving and driving while intoxicated are not readily detected,
and only a small proportion of drunk drivers are apprehended. 143 Be-
cause the opportunity for detection is so rare, significant liability is neces-
sary to deter. 44 Moreover, despite the availability of criminal
sanctions, 145 license revocation is not taken seriously, 146 and neither li-
cense revocation nor short or long periods of imprisonment appear more
effective at deterring drunk driving than substantial fines. 147 Although
the fear of having an accident may provide some disincentive to drinking
before driving, 48 social pressure, pride, and expedience may mitigate the
deterrent effect for all but the most risk-averse.' 49 In short, because of
the low rate of apprehension and the ineffectiveness of compensatory and
criminal liability as deterents, 150 punitive damages may be necessary to
141. See supra notes 44-46 & accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 62-71 & accompanying text.
143. See Beitel, Sharp, & Glauz, Probability ofArrest While Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol, 36 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 109, 114 (1975); Brokenstein, A Panoramic View ofAlcohol,
Drugs and Traffic Safety, 16 POLICE 11-6 (1972); see also Note, supra note 42, at 929.
144. See supra notes 63-66 & accompanying text.
145. See CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23160-23195 (West Supp. 1985).
146. Seventy-five percent of those whose driving licenses were revoked for repeated drunk
driving convictions continued to drive. Ferrin, supra note 24, at 33.
147. Homel, supra note 76, at 237-38.
148. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 909, 598 P.2d at 866, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 705 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
149. See Cramton, supra note 22, at 427.
150. Despite compensatory and penal sanctions, drunken driving continues. However, a
recent increase in the severity and certainty of criminal convictions in California, taking effect
after the Taylor decision, appears to have had at least some short-range deterrent effect. On
January 1, 1982, Assembly Bill 541 went into effect. See CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23152-23195
(West Supp. 1985). The new legislation increased sanctions for drunk driving, restricted plea-
bargaining, and established a conclusive presumption that a driver who had a blood alcohol
level of 0.10% or more was unlawfully under the influence of alcohol. Id.; see also supra note
31. In 1982 there was a significant decrease in the number of fatal and injury accidents in
which alcohol was a factor. DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, TEN YEAR
SUMMARIES § 5 (1983) [hereinafter cited as TEN YEAR SUMMARIES]. Furthermore, based on
California Highway Patrol estimates from nine months of provisional data, only 45% of all
fatal accidents in 1983 involved alcohol, the lowest percentage in five years. CALIFORNIA
OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, CALFORNIA'S ANNUAL EVALUATION REPORT HIGHWAY
SAFETY PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION FOR THE 1983 FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR Table 5, at 8
(1984). Thus, it appears that a combination of increased enforcement, publicity, rate of con-
viction, and severity of penal sanction may have a substantial deterrent effect. See R. PECK,
THE TRAFFIC SAFETY IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW DRUNK DRIVING LAW (AB 541): AN
EVALUATION OF THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF EXPERIENCE 22 (1983).
These results, however, do not clearly show deterrent effect. For example, although the
number of accidents involving alcohol decreased in 1982, the proportion of 1982 accidents in
which alcohol was a primary factor increased by approximately 30% over the same proportion
in 1980. See TEN YEAR SUMMARIES, supra, Table 7E, at 40. Moreover, initial deterrent ef-
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provide sufficient disincentive for drinking and driving. 5 1
Third, if drunken driving can actually be deterred, 152 then a sanc-
tion that focuses on the driver's decision to drink is in theory more likely
to deter than a sanction that focuses on the drinker's decision to drive. If
the decision to drive is made when the defendant is already intoxicated
and thus incapable of weighing the risks, costs, and benefits of the alter-
natives, deterrence is unlikely. 153 If, however, a person knows that liabil-
ity may ensue from her decision to drink when she knows she later must
drive, deterrence is possible because the decision to drink is made while
she possesses the capacity to make a rational decision. ' 54
Finally, the imposition of punitive damages for drunken driving
would result in social efficiency. 15 Drunken driving engenders great so-
cial cost, 156 but the adjudication of a punitive damage claim causes only a
fects may dissipate as the public becomes better informed about the true risks of apprehension
and punishment. See supra notes 80-83 & accompanying text. Initial results may be inaccu-
rate due to statistical problems and uncontrolled variables. See CAUSATION, supra note 72, at
128. Finally, the great publicity over the perils and evils of drunk driving, generated by private
campaigns may account for the initial indication of deterrence. See H. Ross, supra note 80, at
32-34. In summary, although preliminary evaluation of California drunk driving laws renders
hopeful results, the true effect of such sanctions is not yet known. See R. PECK, supra, at 23.
151. Even if a criminal sanction appears to be a more effective deterrent than punitive
damages, the punitive damage sanction may be justified as a supplement to criminal punish-
ment under punishment theory. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 9, at 658.
152. The greater a sanction's severity and certainty, the more likely it will have deterrent
effect. See supra notes 73-83 & accompanying text. Because of the low rate of detection and
apprehension, the certainty of punitive damages may be very low. See supra note 143 & accom-
panying text. Nevertheless, the severity of such liability is great, see supra text accompanying
note 74, and the certainty factor is readily influenced by publicity. See supra notes 80-83 &
accompanying text. In addition, both the certainty and severity factors are augmented because
drunk driving is a reprehensible act. See supra notes 84-85 & accompanying text. Accordingly,
drunk driving should be susceptible at least theoretically to punitive damages deterrence.
For general discussions of the problems in deterring drunk drivers, see DRINKING (J.
Ewing & B. Rouse eds. 1978); Ross & Blumenthal, Sanctions for the Drinking Driver: An
Experimental Study, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 53, 61 (1974).
153. See supra note 86.
154. See supra notes 87-90 & accompanying text. If, however, the defendant is an alco-
holic, he might not have the capacity necessary for deterrence. See Misner & Ward, Severe
Penalties for Driving Offenses: A Deterrence Analysis, 1975 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 677, 703-04. Puni-
tive damages would not be imposed against such a defendant because the "consciousness"
element of the conscious disregard standard is absent. See Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.
3d 890, 899, 598 P.2d 854, 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 699 (1979); supra note 113 & accompany-
ing text.
155. See supra notes 91-94 & accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 24-27 & accompanying text. In Anderson v. Cozens, 60 Cal. App. 3d
130, 131 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1976), the court described the threat posed by drunk driving as "the
carnage and slaughter on California freeways and byways . . . which 'now reaches the as-
tounding figures only heard of on the battlefields.' "Id. at 143-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (quot-
ing Breithrupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957); People v. Fite, 267 Cal. App. 2d 685, 73
Cal. Rptr. 666 (1968) (citations omitted)); see also Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 897-99, 598 P.2d at
858-59, 157 Cal Rptr. at 697-98.
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marginal increase in court and litigation costs. 157 Furthermore, it is un-
likely that any productive conduct would be deterred inadvertently. 158
For instance, if a driver overestimates his potential punitive liability, he
most likely will take precautions against driving or refrain from drinking
altogether.
Cases decided subsequent to Taylor have also held that drunken
driving constitutes a conscious disregard of the safety of others. In Dawes
v. Superior Court,15 9 for example, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
drove while intoxicated, zigzagged in and out of traffic at excessive
speeds in a crowded recreation area, ran a stop sign, and struck the plain-
tiff on a sidewalk. Similarly, the plaintiff in Peterson v. Superior Court160
alleged that the defendant, after drinking alcohol, drove at speeds in ex-
cess of 100 miles per hour, knew that probable serious injury would re-
sult, lost control of the car, and crashed, severely injuring his passenger,
the plaintiff. In both cases, the courts ruled that the allegations stated
facts that satisfied the conscious disregard standard.
Although Taylor,161 Dawes,162 and Peterson163 authorize punitive li-
ability for drunken driving, the plaintiff in each of these cases alleged
more than the defendant's driving under the influence of alcohol. In
Taylor, the defendant had a history of alcohol abuse and alcohol-related
mishaps.' 4 The defendants in Dawes 65 and Peterson 66 allegedly drove
recklessly and at excessive speeds. All three defendants purportedly
caused severe personal injuries to the plaintiff. It is therefore unclear
whether such additional allegations are necessary to satisfy the conscious
disregard standard, or whether the standard can be satisfied in the ab-
sence of such allegations without undermining the policy justifications
for imposing punitive damages.
The following section examines whether drunken driving violates
the conscious disregard standard per se, that is, whether the actor
manifests conscious disregard when he operates a motor vehicle while
intoxicated. 167
157. A punitive damage claim is litigated in conjunction with the claim for compensatory
damages; punitive liability does not require an additional trial. The only additional litigation
costs would be during discovery, regarding the defendant's knowledge of the harmful conse-
quences he created.
158. See supra note 94 & accompanying text.
159. 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 168 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1980).
160. 31 Cal. 3d 147, 642 P.2d 1305, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1982).
161. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
162. 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 168 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1980).
163. 31 Cal. 3d 147, 642 P.2d 1305, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1982).
164. 24 Cal. 3d at 893, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
165. 111 Cal. App. 3d at 85-86, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
166. 31 Cal. 3d at 150, 642 P.2d at 1306, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
167. See supra notes 30-31.
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The Significance of Aggravating Circumstances
In Dawes v. Superior Court,16 the defendant allegedly drove at high
speeds through a crowded recreation area and ran a stop sign. The court
noted that although an intoxicated driver poses only a foreseeable and
possible risk to others, "the risk of injury to others from [the defendant's]
conduct under the circumstances alleged was probable."' 69 Because the
defendant's recklessness made the threatened harm probable rather than
merely possible, the court determined that the plaintiff's allegations had
satisfied the conscious disregard standard. 170 The Dawes decision thus
implies that drunk driving in a nonreckless manner does not pose suffi-
cient danger to satisfy the conscious disregard standard.' 7 1
In Dawes, however, the defendant's conduct occurred prior to the
supreme court decision in Taylor. Because Taylor did not have retroac-
tive effect, 172 the appellate court in Dawes had to decide whether the de-
fendant's conduct would have constituted a conscious disregard of the
safety of others under the law existing prior to Taylor. 173 The court cited
the defendant's hazardous driving to distinguish a prior case 174 in which
the court had held that intoxicated driving alone did not warrant puni-
tive damages.
In light of the supreme court's decisions in Taylor and Peterson,
however, hazardous driving should not be considered a requisite for pu-
168. 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 168 Cal Rptr. 319 (1980).
169. Id. at 89, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 323 (emphasis added).
170. Id. An alternative interpretation is that the defendant's actions in Dawes-driving
through a crowded recreation area---confirned plaintiffs allegation that the defendant knew
the probable dangerous consequences of his act and provided evidence from which the trier of
fact could infer such knowledge.
171. This was not expressly stated in Dawes. The court's actual holding, that plaintiff's
allegations stated facts satisfying the conscious disregard standard, is not questioned here. In-
stead, it is argued that Dawes should not be construed to require hazardous driving for puni-
tive liability in the post-Taylor drunk driving context.
It merits mention that the decision in Dawes is more consistent with the traditional con-
scious disregard standard than the Taylor decision. The conscious disregard standard usually
requires that the actor's conduct threaten a probability of injury to others. Drunken driving
by itself does not pose this probability. See supra note 136 & accompanying text. Driving at
high speed at the entrance to a crowded recreation area while intoxicated, on the other hand,
does threaten such probable harm. Given the California Supreme Court's broad holding in
Taylor, however, this probability of injury does not appear to be necessary. See supra notes
135-37 & accompanying text.
172. Dawes, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 87, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 332. In Mau v. Superior Court, 101
Cal. App. 3d 875, 161 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1980), the court determined that Taylor could not be
applied retroactively. In Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 156, 642 P.2d 1305, 1309,
181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 788 (1982), the California Supreme Court overruled Mau and held that the
Taylor decision could be applied retroactively.
173. Dawes, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 87-88, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23. The court concluded
that the Taylor decision had not significantly changed existing law; the conscious disregard
standard existed well before that decision. Id.
174. Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 322 P.2d 933 (1958).
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nitive liability. First, neither Taylor nor Peterson required an allegation
of hazardous driving. Although in Taylor the plaintiff made no allega-
tions that the defendant had driven in a reckless manner, the court held
that the defendant's act constituted a conscious disregard. 175 Although
the defendant in Peterson allegedly had driven at excessive speeds, the
court did not cite that fact in support of its holding. Instead, the court
concluded that "[t]he gravamen of the proposed complaint, as of the
complaint in Taylor, is that '[d]efendant became intoxicated and thereaf-
ter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the
safety hazard he created thereby.' "176
Second, hazardous driving is not necessary to satisfy any element of
the conscious disregard standard for drunken driving. Under that stan-
dard, the defendant must actually know of the probable dangerous conse-
quences of his act from the outset, before he starts drinking.177
Recklessness occurring after the defendant has become intoxicated is ir-
relevant to punitive damages on the assumption that the intoxicated
driver is not conscious of the hazards of reckless driving.
Third, while the conscious disregard theory existed prior to Taylor,
the "probable dangerous consequences" test did not. 178 Thus, current
cases must assess not only the probability of harm, but also the severity
of harm if it occurs. Driving under the influence, whether at excessive
speeds or not, causes accidents; the severity of that consequence satisfies
the conscious disregard standard.179
Fourth, reckless drunken driving is not a requirement of punishment
theory. Drunken driving presents an egregious hazard in itself.180 The
reprehensible act is drinking with the knowledge that one must later
drive.' 81 Thus, the driver's conduct thereafter need not be considered.
Finally, it may not be possible to deter a driver, once drunk, from
driving recklessly. In his state of inebriation, a drunken driver probably
lacks the capacity to weigh the risks, costs, and benefits of the way he
drives. It is inappropriate to base punitive liability on acts that the de-
fendant committed while under the influence of alcohol. Yet if we pun-
ish reckless drunk drivers, but not "cautious" drunk drivers, liability
turns on the defendant's acts while intoxicated, rather than on his voli-
tional act of becoming intoxicated.
Thus, neither the conscious disregard standard nor public policy jus-
tifies a distinction between drunken drivers who drive recklessly and
175. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 896, 598 P.2d at 858, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
176. Peterson, 31 Cal. 3d at 163, 642 P.2d at 1314, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 793 (quoting Taylor,
24 Cal. 3d at 896, 598 P.2d at 858, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697).
177. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 896, 598 P.2d at 858, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
178. See supra notes 134-35 & accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 137-38 & accompanying text.
180. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 896-99, 598 P.2d at 858-59, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697-98.
181. See supra notes 40-51, 140 & accompanying text.
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drunken drivers who drive cautiously. While the quality of the defend-
ant's driving may influence the amount of the punitive award, the intoxi-
cated driving itself serves as the threshold conduct that authorizes the
imposition of punitive liability. An allegation of hazardous driving
should be necessary to satisfy the conscious disregard standard in drunk
driving cases.
A second type of aggravating circumstance is a defendant's prior
drunken history. In Taylor, the court found that the defendant's prior
drunken driving arrests and accidents supported plaintiff's allegations
that the defendant was actually aware of the probable dangerous conse-
quences of drunk driving.18 2 These aggravating circumstances consti-
tuted evidence from which a jury could infer that the defendant actually
realized the consequences of his act; an allegation of intoxicated driving
alone does not justify this inference. Nevertheless, a history of drinking
and driving is not necessary for punitive liability. Indeed, Taylor explic-
itly stated that such aggravating factors were not essential to punitive
damages. Any allegation that tends to show that the defendant knew of
the probable danger should suffice. As the court stated in Taylor:
Defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that
condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created
thereby. This is the essential gravamen of the complaint, and while a
history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the
probability and foreseeability of an accident, we do not deem these
aggravating factors essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive
damages in drunk driving cases.183
Public policy supports this conclusion. Drunken driving is no less
dangerous, and thus no less egregious, when it is committed by a first-
time offender. The threat posed by a drunken driver does not turn on the
number of previous accidents. 184 When the stakes are so high, drunken
drivers should not be allowed "one free bite."' 85  Thus, evidence of the
defendant's history of drunken driving may suffice, but is not necessary,
182. 24 Cal. 3d at 896, 598 P.2d at 858, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
183. Id.
184. "The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk
driving incidents." Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 897, 598 P.2d at 858, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
185. The reference is to the obsolete idea that a dog owner should not be held liable if his
dog bites someone unless he knew that the dog had bitten before. See W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 9, § 76, at 538-42.
On the other hand, a driver who has not caused prior alcohol-related accidents may be
less motivated to refrain from drinking before driving, and his peers may be less likely to
discourage his driving while intoxicated. His perceived benefit of drinking before driving,
then, would be greater than that of a driver who had previously experienced alcohol-related
mishaps. Thus, the previously "innocent" driver would be less deterrable than one with a
history of drunk driving. See supra notes 86-90 & accompanying text. This does not necessar-
ily mean, however, that an exemplary award would not deter the previously "innocent" driver
altogether. Moreover, punishment theory justifies punitive damages even if deterrence theory
does not. See supra text accompanying notes 40-57, 65-90.
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to prove the defendant's knowledge. The requisite knowledge may also
be proved by evidence of the defendant's previous experiences with alco-
hol, accompaniment of an intoxicated driver, or other awareness of the
commonly understood effects of drinking on driver performance. 186
In sum, the aggravating circumstances present in Dawes and Taylor
should not be required for punitive liability in drunk driving cases.
Reckless driving and prior alcohol-related mishaps are neither indispen-
sable to the conscious disregard standard nor necessary from a policy
standpoint.
Level of Intoxication
The courts have not addressed whether the degree of intoxication
should affect the viability of a punitive damages claim. The relevant Cal-
ifornia statute makes it unlawful to drive with a blood alcohol level of
0.10% or more.1 87 Yet the statute also prohibits operating a motor vehi-
cle while "under the influence of an alcoholic beverage," without defining
the necessary blood alcohol level.1 88  As a result of this statutory
scheme, it is not clear whether a punitive damages claim for drunk driv-
ing must contain an allegation that the defendant drove with a blood
alcohol level of at least 0.10%, or whether the plaintiff must only allege
that the defendant drove while "under the influence."
In Taylor, the court supported its holding with statistics that de-
picted the danger posed by drivers with blood alcohol levels of 0.10% or
higher.1 89 Furthermore, the higher the blood alcohol level, the greater
the defendant's culpability. 190 A person with a 0.25% blood alcohol
level poses a greater danger 91 and more likely knows he is drunk, than
does one with a 0.10% level.
On the other hand, Taylor sought to deter the driver who "volunta-
rily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume alcoholic bever-
186. Cf. Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, 95 Cal. App. 3d 279, 157 Cal. Rptr. 32
(1979); Seimon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 600, 136 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1977)
(knowledge of dangerous condition may give rise to inference of knowledge of probable harm-
ful consequences). This does not result in an imputation of knowledge. The trier of fact's
determination of the defendant's state of mind involves the assessment of the defendant's credi-
bility in denying his awareness. The well-documented, well-publicized, and well-known dan-
gers of drunk driving alone could arguably persuade the trier of fact that the defendant was
disingenuous in his claim of ignorance and did indeed know the probable dangerous conse-
quences of his conduct. Furthermore, an allegation of public knowledge of the dangers of
drunk driving should be sufficient to avoid dismissal of a punitive damages claim as a matter of
law. But see Note, Malice in Wonderland: Taylor v. Superior Court, 8 SAN FERN. V.L. REv.
219, 232-34 (1980).
187. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152(b) (West Supp. 1985); see also supra note 31.
188. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152(a) (West Supp. 1985); see also supra note 31.
189. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 898-99, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
190. See Note, supra note 42, at 930-31.
191. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, DEFENSIVE DRIVER'S MANUAL 23 (7th ed. 1975).
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ages to the point of intoxication. ' 192 Although seriously inebriated
drivers may pose more danger than marginally intoxicated drivers, there
is no magic to the 0.10% level. The reprehensible act is becoming intoxi-
cated before driving, and no further intoxication is necessary for the act
to merit punishment. Furthermore, the only distinction between a mar-
ginally intoxicated driver and a significantly intoxicated driver is the
amount of alcohol the latter consumed after he initially reached the point
of intoxication. Under both punishment and deterrence theory, the focus
should be on the initial act of becoming inebriated before driving, not on
acts committed after the actor has become intoxicated. Similarly, a high
degree of intoxication is not necessary to fulfill the volitional act or actual
knowledge requirements of the conscious disregard standard because
both are satisfied by the time the defendant has become drunk. Thus, as
long as the plaintiff alleges that the defendant was "under the influence"
at the time of the accident, 93 he need not show that the defendant's
blood alcohol exceeded some particular level.
Type, Extent, and Cause of Injury
Other issues not yet addressed by courts include whether the type or
extent of the plaintiff's injuries should affect the applicability of punitive
damages in the drunk driving context and whether the defendant's intox-
ication in particular must have proximately caused that injury.
In Taylor,194 Dawes,19 5 and Peterson,x96 the plaintiffs suffered severe
personal injuries as the purported proximate result of the defendants'
drunk driving. There is no California precedent, however, for imposing
punitive liability on a drunken driver for harm to property or for slight
harm to a person. Furthermore, a drunken driver's actions may be con-
sidered more egregious if he harms people rather than property. More-
over, if the intoxication itself has not caused the harm, it is arguably
unfair to punish a defendant merely for being intoxicated. These views,
however, improperly focus on acts committed after intoxication. The
reprehensible conduct proscribed by the conscious disregard standard is
the act of drinking before driving with the knowledge of the probable
dangerous consequences. Any actual damage is incurred after the de-
fendant has decided to drink and drive. Punitive liability turns on state of
mind, not the fortuitous nature or severity of the actual results. 197 Thus,
as long as the damage sustained is sufficient to warrant compensatory
192. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 899, 598 P.2d at 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699 (emphasis added).
193. Of course, punitive liability should not be imposed if the defendant was not "under
the influence," regardless of his blood alcohol level.
194. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
195. 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 168 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1980).
196. 31 Cal. 3d 147, 642 P.2d 1305, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1982).
197. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, § 2, at 9-11; Mallor & Roberts, supra
note 9, at 651.
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liability,198 neither the amount 99 nor the type2°° of harm-personal in-
jury or property damage-should matter.
Similarly, as long as the defendant proximately caused the harm
that established compensatory liability, it is irrelevant whether the intoxi-
cation itself caused the harm. To require otherwise could place an inor-
dinate burden of proof on the plaintiff, limit punitive recovery when the
plaintiff has otherwise shown that the defendant consciously disregarded
the safety of others, and frustrate the punitive and deterrent goals of ex-
emplary liability.20 1
In summary, issues of the type, amount, or cause of damage, the
extent of intoxication, and the absence of aggravating factors such as
reckless driving or alcoholic history should not by themselves vitiate pu-
nitive damage liability if the allegations otherwise satisfy the conscious
disregard standard. Allegations that a defendant knew that he would
drive, knew the probable dangerous consequences of driving under the
influence, and nevertheless became intoxicated satisfy the conscious dis-
regard formula. The reprehensibility and deterrability of that conduct lie
in the defendant's decision to drink before driving and his subsequent
intoxication; his conduct thereafter is thus irrelevant to a determination
of punitive liability.
This conclusion has an important implication. Because there is no
significant distinction among the various drunk driving scenarios, a puni-
tive damage claim should always go to the trier of fact whenever there is
evidence from which a reasonable person could infer the defendant's voli-
198. An award for punitive damages requires a showing that the plaintiff suffered some
actual damage from the defendant's act. Otherwise, the defendant has not committed a tort,
and punitive damages could not be awarded. See Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d
791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948); Mother Cobb's Chicken Turnovers, Inc. v. Fox, 10 Cal. 2d 203, 73
P.2d 1185 (1937); Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279, 9 P.2d 505 (1932); Vice v. Automobile Club
of S. Cal., 241 Cal. App. 2d 759, 50 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1966).
199. Punitive damages may be awarded even if there is only nominal damage. See Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Benatar, 99 Cal. App. 2d 393, 221 P.2d 965 (1950); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908 & comment c (1979). The amount of damage, however, may indirectly indicate
the reprehensiveness of the act, which the jury may consider in assessing the punitive amount.
See supra note 75.
200. In Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc. 2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973), the only reported case
in which the defendant sustained property damage rather than personal injuries, an intoxicated
driver ran into and damaged plaintiff's parked car. The court held that a punitive damage
award was proper, noting that punitive damages were permissible if the wrong complained of
was morally reprehensible, or was actuated by evil and reprehensible motives. The fact that
damage was to property, rather than to persons, was apparently not considered.
201. California Civil Code § 1714(b) (West Supp. 1985) states that "the consumption of
alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated
person." Therefore, the legislature has presumed intoxication to be the proximate cause of
injuries as evidence of its refusal to condone driving under the influence of alcohol. See Taylor,
24 Cal. 3d at 897-98, 598 P.2d at 858-59, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697-98.
May 1985)
tion and knowledge of probable dangerous consequences. 20 2 Thus, the
propriety of punitive liability rests not on factual aspects of a particular
case, but on whether the exemplary sanction continues to be an effective
and necessary deterrent. Consequently, there is continued need to scruti-
nize the deterrent effect of new criminal sanctions.20 3
Conclusion
Public policy supports the imposition of punitive liability for repre-
hensible, deterrable acts of high cost to society. Under the conscious
disregard standard, exemplary damages are appropriate when the de-
fendant has volitionally acted, or failed to act, with actual knowledge of
the probable harmful consequences.
Policy and precedent support the availability of punitive damages to
any plaintiff proximately harmed by a drunk driver. The reprehensibility
and deterrability of the defendant's becoming intoxicated before driving
precludes consideration of the nature or extent of the plaintiff's injury, or
of the defendant's level of intoxication, drunk driving history, or driving
performance.
This conclusion engenders a final qualification. Although public
policy and the conscious disregard standard support the same result in
theory, the application of that standard may yield unjustified punitive
assessments because it recognizes "evidence from which a jury may in-
fer" as one of its elements. While this may be the inevitable price of a
legal standard implemented by the trier of fact, the potential disparity
between theory and result warrants further consideration of reform.
Carl W. Chamberlin*
202. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c (West Supp. 1985) (motion for summary judg-
ment). Of course, the trier of fact always has discretion to decline to award punitive damages.
See Ellis, supra note 2, at 37-43; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 9, at 644-46.
203. See supra note 150.
* Member, third year class.
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